“CA blocks bad actors”
CA blocks authentication attempts that fail policy checks. It does not stop attackers operating with already-approved sessions, tokens, or delegated access.
Conditional Access (CA) is one of the most important controls in modern identity platforms—but it is often treated as something it is not. Organizations increasingly rely on CA as if it were a firewall: blocking “bad traffic” and allowing “good traffic.” That mental model is flawed, and attackers exploit the gap.
Conditional Access decides *when* you can authenticate — not *what happens next*.
Conditional Access evaluates conditions at authentication time: user, device, location, risk, and context. Once access is granted, CA largely steps out of the execution path. Treating it as a continuous enforcement layer leads to dangerous assumptions about containment, visibility, and blast radius.
CA blocks authentication attempts that fail policy checks. It does not stop attackers operating with already-approved sessions, tokens, or delegated access.
OAuth abuse, token replay, admin misuse, and API activity all occur after CA has already granted access.
Teams assume CA limits blast radius when, in reality, it only gates the door — not movement inside the building.
Understanding CA’s true scope is the first step to using it correctly.
CA evaluates context at sign-in: identity, device posture, network location, and risk signals.
Once conditions are met, a session or token is issued that represents trust.
CA does not continuously re-evaluate every API call or user action. Enforcement after login is minimal.
These misunderstandings shape defensive blind spots — and attacker playbooks.
CA has no understanding of intent. A compromised admin session from a compliant device still looks “allowed.”
IP-based trust collapses under VPNs, cloud infrastructure, and compromised endpoints. Trusted locations are easily inherited by attackers.
MFA reduces authentication risk. It does not govern authorization, delegation, or post-login behavior.
Most non-human identities bypass CA entirely. Tokens issued to apps operate outside many CA assumptions.
Once inside, attackers don’t fight CA — they work around it.
Stolen sessions inherit all CA trust without triggering new evaluations.
Apps receive permissions that persist beyond user sign-in and bypass interactive controls.
Compromised admins can modify CA policies themselves, shaping enforcement to their needs.
Conditional Access success metrics often hide real exposure.
High CA coverage does not limit what attackers can do once access is granted.
Most audits validate configuration, not operational abuse paths.
Teams expect CA to contain incidents that actually unfold entirely within “allowed” access.
CA is foundational — but only when paired with complementary controls.
Assume attackers will operate inside compliant sessions. Detect and govern activity, not just login attempts.
Changes to CA policies should be monitored, alerted, and treated as high-risk events.
Reduce session lifetime, monitor refresh behavior, and design revocation paths.
Report on time-to-revoke access, OAuth exposure, and privileged session monitoring — not just MFA coverage.