AI replays context
Models replay documents, deals, HR data, M&A details, and executive mail threads to whoever asks the right question. Prompt injection is not a breach—it is misuse of your own insider.
AI assistants integrated with Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and SaaS act like power users: they read files, summarize threads, explore shared drives, and transform sensitive documents. They do not “break in”—they reuse access that your business already granted them. That makes AI the most dangerous insider your organization has ever invited.
The core risk isn’t “AI gone rogue.” It’s humans leaking sensitive data to the model—and the model faithfully leaking it to others later.
AI copilots behave like internal employees with perfect recall, no political context, and no instinct for confidentiality. They are insiders with distributed memory. If your policy assumes “only the person who saw the secret can leak the secret,” you are already behind.
Models replay documents, deals, HR data, M&A details, and executive mail threads to whoever asks the right question. Prompt injection is not a breach—it is misuse of your own insider.
Access controls don’t prevent leakage if users voluntarily paste sensitive content or AI outputs it on request. Governance must treat models as privileged agents, not apps.
The largest failures are cultural: asking the model for “a summary of our layoffs plan,” “draft the M&A offer,” or “generate a list of customer churn candidates.”
Legacy security models assume a human → app → storage workflow. AI flips this: human → model → memory → global context. The model becomes the workspace.
Even when “no training” is enabled, embeddings, session history, and prompt stitching persist information. The model becomes a shadow knowledge base.
Ask a model for “a competitive analysis” and it might combine internal R&D documents with public pricing leaks and confidential partner agreements.
Humans trust AI outputs by default. If the model is wrong, hallucinating, or mixing contexts, senior decisions get corrupted quietly.
These patterns do not involve breaches or malware. They exploit human trust.
User A pastes internal payroll data. User B later asks “help me plan cost savings” and receives those payroll details abstracted into recommendations.
Sensitive outputs from Workspace Copilot get pasted into a public AI model for “formatting,” bypassing enterprise controls completely.
Even “no training” does not mean “no memory.” Local embeddings, security logs, vector databases, and semantic caches retain context.
Treat AI agents like employees with superpowers. Your policy must assume misuse.
AI must have its own identity, RBAC, and scopes. Never let models act as the user or share user credentials.
Sales AI ≠ HR AI ≠ R&D AI. Prevent cross-domain recall. Separate models, embeddings, storage, and inference.
Disable “auto-approval,” “auto-action,” or “make changes” features until governance is mature. Humans should confirm everything.
Enforcement must be cultural: “Never paste private financials, legal drafts, or client secrets into the model.”
You cannot ban AI. You can make it behave like a well-monitored insider.
Workspace/M365 copilot is not ChatGPT.com. Treat external models as untrusted vendors.
The dangerous secrets are not in prompts. They’re in embeddings and retrieval layers.
Look for unauthorized browser tools, side-loaded extensions, “admin copilots” for internal automation, and bot accounts.
Teach the board and C-suite to treat models as leakers, not geniuses. Their usage patterns become cultural defaults.